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Abstract
We study two-stage choice procedures in which the decision maker first preselects the
alternatives whose values according to a criterion pass a menu-dependent threshold,
and then maximizes a second criterion to narrow the selection further. This framework
overlaps with several existing models that have various interpretations and impose var-
ious additional restrictions on behavior. We show that the general class of procedures
is characterized by acyclicity of the revealed “first-stage separation relation.”
1 Introduction
Several recent contributions to axiomatic choice theory have studied two-stage procedures in
which first a subset of alternatives is preselected and then a maximization operation narrows
the selection further. Examples include Cherepanov et al. [3], Lleras et al. [4], Manzini and
Mariotti [5], Masatlioglu et al. [6], and Tyson [11]. The interpretations of these models vary
considerably, with the preselection stage used in [3] to express the desire for a psychological
“rationalization” of the eventual choice, in [4] to allow active consideration of a subset of
alternatives only, and in [5] to capture a “noncompensatory heuristic.”
In this paper we investigate two-stage procedures in which the preselection mechanism
has a threshold representation of the sort considered by Aleskerov and Monjardet [1] and
Tyson [10]. Such a representation involves a criterion function f on the set of alternatives
and a threshold function θ on the set of menus. Alternative x is preselected from menu A if
its value f(x) is at least the threshold θ(A) assigned to this choice problem. Writing g for
the second-stage maximand, the solutions of the constrained optimization problem
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max
x∈A
g(x) subject to f(x) ≥ θ(A)
are then the options selected from menu A by the full two-stage procedure.
This type of “two-stage threshold” (TST) representation is of interest because it overlaps
with a number of the theories of choice mentioned above. Cognitive mechanisms for dealing
with complex decision problems, such as attention and satisficing, are naturally modeled with
thresholds. And since the resulting preselection may be coarse, with numerous alternatives
achieving the threshold, a second criterion can help to further refine the options.
Our goal is to determine how the TST representation constrains behavior independently
of any extra restrictions implied by more specific models. This is accomplished by our main
result, which characterizes the representation in terms of a single axiom on the choice func-
tion. The axiom imposes acyclicity on the “first-stage separation relation” encoding when
one alternative is chosen over another despite evidence that they cannot be distinguished at
the second stage. This is of course implied by the acyclicity condition that characterizes the
one-stage threshold model (a result included below for the sake of comparison).
In general the consequences of adding a second stage to a choice-theoretic model can
be difficult to predict. Allowing an ordinary preference maximizer to break his indifference
by maximizing a second criterion does not change the behavioral possibilities.1 In contrast,
the TST model turns out to have considerably less empirical content than its one-stage
counterpart. This is shown most clearly by a corollary of our main result stating that for the
special case of single-valued choice functions, the TST representation places no constraints
whatsoever on behavior. We conclude that models consistent with the TST framework get
most of their logical strength not from the representation itself, but rather from the additional
restrictions they impose.
We characterize TST representations in Section 2, discuss more specialized models in
Section 3, and prove our main result in Section 4.
2 Characterization results
Fix a nonempty, finite set X, and let D ⊆ A = 2X \ {∅}. Each x ∈ X is an alternative,
and each A ∈ D is a menu. A choice function is any C : D → A such that ∀A ∈ D we
have C(A) ⊆ A. Here C(A) is the choice set assigned to A, with the interpretation that
those and only those alternatives in C(A) could be chosen from this menu. Without loss of
generality, assume that ∀x ∈ X we have {x} ∈ D.
We study the class of choice functions that select alternatives from menu A by maximizing
g(x) subject to f(x) ≥ θ(A), where f, g : X → < and θ : D → <. In the context of such a
representation we refer to f as the primary criterion, g as the secondary criterion, and θ as
the threshold map. The triple 〈f, θ, g〉 will be called a profile.
We define first the threshold set containing those alternatives on a menu with sufficiently
high values of the primary criterion.
Definition 1. Given a pair 〈f, θ〉 and an A ∈ D, let Γ(A|f, θ) = {x ∈ A : f(x) ≥ θ(A)}.
1Lexicographic maximization of two weak orders is behaviorally equivalent to maximization of a single
weak order, both being characterized by Richter’s [7, p. 637] congruence axiom.
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The model under investigation can now be defined formally.
Definition 2. A two-stage threshold representation of C is a profile 〈f, θ, g〉 such that ∀A ∈ D
we have C(A) = argmaxx∈Γ(A|f,θ) g(x).
For the sake of concreteness, we provide an illustration of how the functions f , θ, and g
interact to determine choice behavior, using a multiplicative notation for enumerated sets.
Example 1. Let f(x) = 1, f(y) = 0, f(z) = 2, g(x) = 1, g(y) = 1, g(z) = 0, θ(xy) = 1,
θ(xz) = 2, θ(yz) = 0, and θ(xyz) = 0. The profile 〈f, θ, g〉 is then a TST representation of
the choice function given by C(xy) = x, C(xz) = z, C(yz) = y, and C(xyz) = xy.
Among other things, this demonstrates that the TST model can accommodate cyclical binary
choices. However, a slight modification to the choice function in this example suffices to show
that not all varieties of behavior are allowed.
Example 2. Let C(xy) = x, C(xz) = z, C(yz) = y, and C(xyz) = xyz. If 〈f, θ, g〉 were a
TST representation of C, then C(xyz) = xyz would imply g(x) = g(y) = g(z). But then the
remaining choice data would imply f(x) ≥ θ(xy) > f(y) ≥ θ(yz) > f(z) ≥ θ(xz) > f(x), a
contradiction.
Determining the empirical content of the two-stage threshold model requires us to identify
conditions that distinguish choice functions consistent with a TST representation from those
that are not. To do this we shall employ a number of binary relations that are “behavioral”
in the sense of being derived from C, beginning with the separation relation.
Definition 3. Let xSy if ∃A ∈ D such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A \ C(A).
In other words, x is separated from y when there exists a menu on which both are available, x
is choosable, and y is not. If choices maximize a utility function, then separation reveals the
corresponding strict preferences. On the other hand, indifference is revealed by choosability
from the same menu, encoded in the togetherness relation.
Definition 4. Let xTy if ∃A ∈ D such that x, y ∈ C(A).
It is also useful to define the transitive closure of T , which we shall refer to as the extended
togetherness relation.
Definition 5. Let xEy if ∃z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ X such that x = z1Tz2T · · ·Tzn = y.
Note that since T is both reflexive and symmetric, E is an equivalence.2 In classical revealed
preference analysis, E-equivalence classes amount to revealed indifference curves.
When C has a TST representation 〈f, θ, g〉 instead of an ordinary utility representation,
the relations S and T must be interpreted differently. Here xSy implies either f(x) > f(y)
or g(x) > g(y), since the separation of x from y must occur — speaking in terms of the
representation — at either the first or the second stage. Meanwhile, xTy tells us nothing
about the first stage but ensures that g(x) = g(y), and likewise for extended togetherness.
2A relation R on X is an equivalence if it is reflexive (∀x ∈ X we have xRx), symmetric (∀x, y ∈ X we
have xRy only if yRx), and transitive (∀x, y, z ∈ X we have xRyRz only if xRz).
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Though neither S nor T by itself says anything definitive about the first stage of a TST
representation, they can be used together to elicit such information. Indeed, we have seen
this already in Example 2, where xTy implied g(x) = g(y), and so xSy could only mean that
f(x) > f(y). This remains true for alternatives related by extended togetherness, which is to
say that separations between alternatives in the same E-equivalence class must be attributed
to the first stage. To capture this reasoning, we define the first-stage separation relation.
Definition 6. Let xFy if both xEy and xSy.
This definition suggests a necessary condition for the TST model. Example 2 shows how
xFyFzFx leads to a contradiction, and an F -cycle of any length would yield the same result.
The condition is thus that the first-stage separation relation be acyclic; i.e., that there be
no S-cycle within an E-equivalence class.3 Note that this is satisfied in Example 1, where E
partitions the alternatives as {xy, z} and the S-cycles present are xSySzSx and xSzSx.
Remarkably, acyclicity of F turns out also to be sufficient for the TST framework.
Theorem. A choice function has a two-stage threshold representation if and only if the
relation F is acyclic.
This result involves no monotonicity (e.g., contraction or expansion consistency) conditions
or congruence axioms of the sort common in the revealed preference literature. Likewise,
no constraint links pairwise choices to those from larger menus, even if pairwise choice data
happen to be available. The single condition needed is straightforward to state, and its role
can be appreciated in contexts as simple as Examples 1 and 2.
The above theorem is proved formally in Section 4; here we merely sketch the argument
for sufficiency. Given acyclicity of F , we first construct a secondary criterion that is constant
on E-equivalence classes and otherwise orders the alternatives arbitrarily. We then construct
a primary criterion that orders the alternatives in agreement with F inside E-equivalence
classes — the acyclicity condition ensuring that no contradiction arises at this point — and
otherwise in opposition to the secondary criterion. The threshold for each menu A is set
equal to the minimum of the primary criterion over the choice set C(A). And it can then be
confirmed that the resulting profile is a TST representation of the choice function.4
Two special cases are worth mentioning. First, when the secondary criterion is constant,
the second stage vanishes and for each menu the choice and threshold sets coincide.
Definition 7. A one-stage threshold representation of C is a pair 〈f, θ〉 such that ∀A ∈ D
we have C(A) = Γ(A|f, θ).
Under such a representation any separation xSy implies f(x) > f(y), so clearly the entire
relation S must be acyclic. Again this necessary condition can be shown also to be sufficient,
yielding a characterization obtained by Aleskerov and Monjardet [1].
3A relation R on X is acyclic if ∀x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ X we have x1Rx2R · · ·Rxn only if ¬[xnRx1].
4For instance, take the choice function in Example 1. Here since xEy we need g(x) = g(y), and we can
arbitrarily set g(z) < g(x). Since xFy we need f(x) > f(y), and since g(z) < g(x) we also need f(z) > f(x).
Finally, the thresholds will satisfy θ(xy) = f(x), θ(xz) = f(z), θ(yz) = f(y), and θ(xyz) = f(y). Note that
this constructed profile will not be the same in all respects — even ordinally — as the original profile in
Example 1, but will nevertheless be a TST representation of the choice function.
4
Proposition. A choice function has a one-stage threshold representation if and only if the
relation S is acyclic.
The second special case is that of single-valued choice functions. When all choice sets are
singletons the relations T and E are both empty, and hence F too is empty. But then F is
trivially acyclic, allowing us to conclude the following as a consequence of our theorem.
Corollary. Any single-valued choice function has a two-stage threshold representation.
In this context the sufficiency argument outlined above is much simplified. Since E is empty,
we can take g to be an arbitrary one-to-one function. Furthermore, since F is empty we can
set f = −g. A menu’s threshold will of course be the f -value of the unique element of the
choice set. With the two criteria one-to-one and diametrically opposed, it is then immediate
that the profile constructed makes up a TST representation.
3 More specialized models
To the best of our knowledge two-stage threshold representations have not previously been
studied in isolation. However, several authors have proposed theories that overlap with the
TST model, based on a variety of hypotheses about the process of decision making.
1. Lleras et al. [4] introduce a model in which the alternatives actively considered by the
decision maker are a subset of those available. To obtain behavioral restrictions, they
require that for any two menus A and B such that A ⊆ B, an alternative x ∈ A is
considered in choice problem B only if it is also considered in problem A. The TST
framework will generate a special case of this model if the primary criterion f measures
the propensity of an alternative to be considered, the threshold map θ returns minimum
f -values for consideration, and θ is monotone (i.e., A ⊆ B implies θ(A) ≤ θ(B)).5 The
secondary criterion g here represents an ordinary utility function.
2. Masatlioglu et al. [6] suppose that alternatives are pre-selected not by active consider-
ation but rather by the decision maker’s awareness of them. Here it is assumed that if
all alternatives perceived in choice problem B are available on some menu A ⊆ B, then
the options perceived in problems A and B will be identical.6 Once again a special
case of this model can be generated by the TST structure: With f and θ governing
awareness, and g measuring utility, a sufficient condition for the above assumption is
that A ⊆ B and max f [B \ A] < θ(B) together imply θ(A) = θ(B).
3. Tyson [11] studies a model in which the decision maker’s preferences among alternatives
are perceived imperfectly, the coarseness of this perception is increasing with respect
to ⊆, and the choice between perceived-preference-maximal options is controlled by a
5Indeed, many of the illustrations provided by Lleras et al., such as considering “the n cheapest options,”
are consistent with the TST special case. Related models are described by Salant and Rubinstein [8] under
the rubric of “choice with frames.”
6In stating this “attention filter” assumption Masatlioglu et al. let A = B \ {x}. But this is without loss
of generality when D = A, as imposed in [6].
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binary relation that can be interpreted as a measure of relative “salience.” This model
admits a TST representation in which f is the utility function, θ returns satisfaction
levels, and g is a salience mapping. In addition, the model imposes the “expansiveness”
restriction that A ⊆ B and max f [A] ≥ θ(B) together imply θ(A) ≥ θ(B).
These theories interpret the components of the profile 〈f, θ, g〉 in quite different ways.
In particular, the first two models view the secondary criterion as the appropriate welfare
measure, while the third assigns this role to the primary criterion. Moreover, in the consid-
eration and awareness frameworks the threshold map controls whether or not alternatives
advance to the utility-maximization stage.7 This contrasts with the third framework, where
θ interacts directly with the utility function and implements a form of satisficing behavior.
Interpretation aside, all three of the above models impose restrictions beyond the basic
two-stage threshold structure that constrain C in various ways. Since our theorem identifies
the empirical content of the TST structure itself, the incremental content of these additional
restrictions amounts to the logical gap between our F -acyclicity condition and the axioms
that characterize the more elaborate models. For instance, in Tyson [11] the combination of
“Weak Congruence” and “Base Transitivity” is stronger than acyclicity of F , and the extra
logical force is what yields the expansiveness property of the TST representation.
Of course, our corollary establishes that the TST framework has no intrinsic empirical
content when C is single-valued. Under this assumption the axioms that characterize a more
specialized model use all of their logical force to impose restrictions on the representation. For
example, the TST special case of the consideration model in Lleras et al. [4] lacks empirical
content in the single-valued setting until we require the threshold map to be monotone.
4 Proof of Theorem
Let C have a TST representation 〈f, θ, g〉. If ∃x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ X such that x1Fx2F · · ·Fxn,
then x1Ex2E · · ·Exn and so g(x1) = g(x2) = · · · = g(xn). We have also x1Sx2S · · ·Sxn, and
it follows that f(x1) > f(x2) > · · · > f(xn). Since both f(xn) ≤ f(x1) and g(xn) ≤ g(x1),
we have ¬[xnSx1] and so ¬[xnFx1]. Hence F is acyclic.
Conversely, suppose that F is acyclic. Write K(x) for the E-equivalence class of x ∈ X,
define K = {K(x) : x ∈ X}, and let  be any linear order on K.8 Let φ : K → < be any
representation of , and for each x ∈ X assign g(x) = −φ(K(x)). The function g : X → <
so defined will be the secondary criterion. Observe that xEy only if K(x) = K(y) and hence
g(x) = g(y). Finally, let xQy if either xFy or g(x) < g(y), and note that then we have xQy
only if g(x) ≤ g(y).
Lemma. The relation Q is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose that ∃x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ X such that x1Qx2Q · · ·Qxn, and define xn+1 = x1.
If xnQx1, then since F is acyclic there exists a k ≤ n such that g(xk) < g(xk+1). But since
7Note that using thresholds to model phenomena related to attention and awareness is natural in light of
how the human visual, auditory, and other sensory systems operate (see, e.g., Anderson [2]).
8A relation R on X is a linear order if it is asymmetric (∀x, y ∈ X we have xRy only if ¬[yRx]), negatively
transitive (∀x, y, z ∈ X we have xRz only if either xRy or yRz), and weakly complete (∀x, y ∈ X we have
x 6= y only if either xRy or yRx).
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xk+1Qxk+2Q · · ·QxnQx1Qx2Q · · ·Qxk, we have also g(xk+1) ≤ g(xk), a contradiction. Hence
¬[xnQx1] and Q is acyclic.
Since Q is acyclic, its transitive closure is a strict partial order which (as a consequence of
Szpilrajn’s Theorem [9]) can be strengthened to a linear order P .9 Let the primary criterion
f : X → < be any representation of P . Furthermore, define the threshold map θ : D → <
by assigning each θ(A) = minx∈C(A) f(x).
Fix a menu A and note that by construction we have C(A) ⊆ Γ(A|f, θ). Observe also
that x, y ∈ C(A) implies xEy and thus g(x) = g(y). Hence there exists a g ∈ < such that
∀x ∈ C(A) we have g(x) = g. To establish that 〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C, it
then suffices to show that ∀y ∈ Γ(A|f, θ) \ C(A) we have g(y) < g.
Now fix y ∈ Γ(A|f, θ)\C(A), and take any x ∈ C(A) such that f(x) = θ(A). If g(y) > g,
then since g(x) = g we have xQy. Alternatively, if g(y) = g then K(x) = K(y) and so xEy.
Since also xSy, we then have xFy and once again xQy. But from xQy it follows that xPy
and hence f(y) < f(x) = θ(A), contradicting y ∈ Γ(A|f, θ). We conclude that g(y) < g, and
thus 〈f, θ, g〉 is a TST representation of C.
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